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The establishment of an autonomous Palestinian
state in the West Bank is not in the true interest of the
Palestinian people. Those who think immediate autonomy
would be another step toward a new and improved world order
disregard the history of almost every revolution from 1789 to
1989. The history of Israel, the West Bank, and Jordan
indicates that if the Palestinians remain patient, within 20
years, they will peacefully assume control of a democratic
government with an established bureacracy, legal system, and
economy.
"Land for Peace" is a catchy phrase, but it is also a
dangerous over-simplification which ignores political reality
and historical trends. Israel's refusal to allow truly democratic
elections and political freedoms has prevented Palestine from
establishing a democratic tradition. Given the political
oppression and violence of the last 25-year Israeli occupation,
military and political withdrawl would be equivalent to the
overthrow of an authoritarian or totalitarian system. Two
centuries of history show that after the initial revolutionary
euphoria wears off, the united revolutionary opposition (i.e.
the Third Estate, Solidarity, and perhaps the PLO) splinters
into conflicting groups that struggle to fill the power vacuum.
Revolutionary states without democratic traditions slip into
anarchy, civil war, and/or tyranny as in the cases of the late
eighteenth and nineteenth century French governments. Even
if the Palestinians were to establish a democratic government
immediately after their autonomy was granted, the lack of a
democratic tradition would make them susceptible to the same
civil strife and tyranny that undermined the Weimar Republic.
United They Seem, Divided They Are
After withdrawal, the PLO would not assume power
as a united coalition government. The history and structure of
the PLO shows that it is not a team of players shooting at the
same goal. The PLO is essentially a cartel of various self-
interested groups united to increase their own power. The
guerrilla groups, which formed in the late 1950s and early
1960s, did not receive much attention and support from
Palestinians until after the 1967 June War. During the war,
Syria, Egypt, and Jordan not only failed to liberate Palestine,
but also surrendered the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and Golan
Heights. Palestinians attributed these humiliating losses to the
incompetence of the Arab armies and to the Arab states' lack
of concern for for the Palestinian people. Consequently, many
Palestinians joined guerrilla groups, such as the original
Palestine Liberation Organization, which was a puppet of
Nasser, and Fateh, an independent guerrilla group led by
Yassir Arafat (Cobban41) By 1969, most Palestinian military,
political, economic, and social organizations saw that the only
way to acheive their one common goal was to set aside their
ideological conflicts and form an "umbrella organization"
called the PLO. (Goldschmit 406)
The PLO is a diverse coalition of eight parties,
movements and guerrilla groups, each with different leaders,
ideologies, and agendas. Most of the groups in the PLO
espouse one of three programs. One type calls for the unification
of all Arab states and the subsequent use of a united Arab army
to liberate Palestine. This ideology was adopted by the Arab
Nationalist Movement, the precurser to the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) led by Geoge Habbash. A
second type concentrates strictly on the liberation of Palestine.
This limited commitment has been espoused by Yassir Arafat
and his Fateh movement The third type of group carries out
whatever policies their state sponsors dictate, as in the case of
the Iraqi-sponored Arab Liberation Front, Lybia's Popular
Palestinian Liberation Front, and the Syrian-supported
Vanguards of the popular War of Liberation, commonly
known as Saiqa.
The PLO constitution reveals the tenuous relationship
between its members. Since the various organizations of the
PLO espouse conflicting ideologies, the PLO's institutions
and policies must reflect the ideologies and needs of all
groups. The PLO's constitution rests "the supreme authority"
of the PLO in the popularly elected 400 member Palestinian
National Council (PNC). The PNC's members are chosen by
an informal process of negotiation between the eight member
groups because elections would be impossible to hold among
a population in diaspora and under occupation. (Long 294)
This process ensures that the PNC represents all ideologies.
The PNC elects an Executive Committee to determine the
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FLO's policies. The Executive Committee adopts policies
based on consensus among all factions of the PLO. This
decision-making process gives a disproportionate influence to
smaller, radical groups who have been able to prevent the PLO
from enacting conciliatory policies. (Long 294) The Executive
committee must please all groups, or risk the dissolution of the
entire organization.
The threat of the PLO's disintegration over an
ideological dispute is very real. In 1968, a faction of the PFLP
split from its parent group and formed the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command. In 1969, the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine led by Nay if
Hawatmeh also broke away from the PFLP. Power struggles
have also splintered Yasir Arafat's organization, Fateh. In
1970, Keta'ib an-Nasr and his Victory Battalions split from
Arafat. Since 1974, Iraq has supported Abu Nidal and his
faction's struggle for control over Fateh. In 1976, a Syrian-
supported renegade group, Revolutionary Fateh, unsuccessfully
challenged Arafat's leadership.
By the early 1970s, all member groups of the PLO
belonged toeitheroftwo ideological divisions. The mainstream
group concentrated more on diplomacy, while the Rejection
Front was more militant In 1983 the PLO split into three
factions. One set of members supported Arafat's pursuit of a
diplomatic solution. The second group, the National Salvation
Alliance, opposed Arafat's diplomacy. The third, the
Democratic Alliance, supported Arafat on most policies except
his close ties with the pro-West regimes of Jordan's King
Hussein and Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak.
The various groups of the PLO often pursue their
own interests at the expense of the whole organization. For
Autonomy would condemn the
Palestinian people to a civil war.
example, in 1970, the PFLP defied the Palestinian National
Council and committed a series of hijackings and bombings.
The terrorist acts of the PFLP drew the entire PLO into a
savage war with Jordan that killed 3,000 Palestinians and
almost eliminated the entire PLO. On 20 June 1990, a militant
faction of the PLO, the Palestinian Liberation Front, attacked
an Israeli beach. The attack was a military failure, but it
achieved its political goal of disrupting negotiations between
Arafat and the United States. Although the Executive
Committee of the PLO condemned the PLF's renegade actions,
the Bush Administration broke off discusssion with the entire
PLO. The history and composition of the PLO indicates that
once Israel's reign over the West Bank and Gaza Strip ends,
this umbrella organization will fold and its various factions
will fight for power.
Although the largest, best-armed factions of the PLO
would be the main competitors for power, several other
movements and groups will also compete. The Intifada has
seen the emergence of new movements inside the occupied
territories. Members of popular committees and mayors, who
were responsible for distributing food, collecting garbage, and
maintaining morale during curfews, have acquired the support
of many Palestinians who resent the PLO leaders and their
Tunisian seaside villas. Another source of competition would
come from the militant Islamic fundamentalist group, Hamas.
The past f ractiousness of the PLO and the emergence of new
challengers for power in the occupied territories indicate that
Hussein maintained a working
relationship with Israel in order to
influence West Bank politics.
if the Israelis withdrew without having first engendered a
democratic tradition, they would not spawn democracy and
liberty in the territories. Instead, a premature withdrawl would
leave a power vacuum, along with several unrestrained and
armed organizations with a desire to fill that vacuum. Autonomy
would condemn the Palestinian people to a civil war. Thus,
Palestinian autonomy would, like most revolutions, eat its
own children.
Palestine Is Not Jordan... But It Will Be
The strong historical ethnic, economic, and religious
ties between Palestine and Jordan indicate that a Palestinian-
controlled democratic state will inevitably replace the Jordanian
monarchy. Jordan and Palestine were the results of the 1916
secretSykes-PicotagreementbetweenGreatBritain and France
in which the two countries agreed that the British would
control the area between the Egyptian border and eastern
Arabia. The British chose this area, which later became
Transjordan, because it provided a secure passage to India. An
enclave around Jaffa and Jerusalem was to be formed and
administered by an international government because Russia
wanted to help administer the Holy Land. This arbitrary
enclave became Palestine and Israel. The great powers
established the borders according to their own interest and
ignored the ethnic, historical, religious, and linguistic ties
between the Palestinian and Tranjordanian peoples. King
Abdullah of Transjordan probably considered these ties when
he seized Eastern Palestine, the West Bank of the Jordan
River, in 1948 and annexed it in 19S0.
The400,OOOWestBankPalestiniansandthe480,000
Palestinian refugees that were added to Transjordan's 400,000
inhabitants in 1948 have greatly affected Jordan's political
system. (Sahliyeh 10) Abdullah's need for the cooperation
and loyalty of the Palestinians inspired him to grant them full
Jordanian citizenship with equal political, educational, and
economic rights. (Long 226) On 20 July, 1951 a Palestinian
nationalist murdered Abdullah. A predominantly East Bank
Bedouin Army under theguidanceof British officers guaranteed
the succession of Abdullah's son Talal, but Talal's mental
instability weakened the monarchy's influence over the West
Bank. In order to retain its power, the monarchy promulgated
a new constitution in 1952 which gave the West Bank
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Palestinians the right to participate in Jordanian politics. The
constitution established a bicameral legislature. The lower
house, the House of Representatives, would be elected by
popular vote in three East Bank Bedouin districts, seven
regular East Bank districts, and seven districts on the West
Bank. (Long 230) This designation of districts ensured that
East Bank representatives, who were assumed to be loyal
monarchists, always had a majority. However, the monarchy
still retained ultimate authority over government policy. The
superficial political reforms appeased Jordan's potentially-
rebellious public. Thus, the new constitution enabled the
monarchy to survive the year-long transition from Talal,
whose successors forced him to abdicate in January, 1952, to
Within the next 20 years a Palestinian
majority will elect a Palestinian official
who will assert control over a
nominally Jordanian state.
a regency council, and finally to Talal's young son Hussein,
who assumed the throne in 1953. (Long 226)
Not even Israel's military occupation since 1967 has
demolished the economic, political, religious, and ethnic
bridges between East and West Bank. Hussein's desire to
appeal to the West Bank Palestinians, in the hope of future
reunification, has affected Jordan's political policies and
institutions. Despite the disapproval of every Arab state,
Hussein maintained a working relationship with Israel in order
to influence West Bank politics. Hussein used his grandfather's
practice of gaining loyalty through charity. With Israel's
permission, Jordan gained indirect influence over the West
Bank by giving consumer goods to the governors and mayors.
These officials then traded these goods for loyalty, and thereby
controlled the West Bank. Jordan's economic influence and
the PLO's ideological inspiration dominated West Bank politics
until the late 1970s, when the Likud government's Village
Leagues and repressive activities began to radicalize nationalist
and Islamic movements, like the Hamas. The importance that
the Palestinian's placed on goods and international terrorism
declined, while the role of religious and local resistance
leaders in daily life increased. The Jordanian-sponsored
mayors became more influential during the Intifada because
they organized the National Guidance Council and coordinated
popular resistance.
Hussein altered Jordan's political institutions in order
to maintain the possibility of reunifying the East Bank and
West Bank. During the early days of the Israeli occupation,
West Bank districts were allocated seats in the Jordanian
parliament In 1974, the Arab States recognized the PLO as
the sole representative of the Palestinian people at the Rabat
conference. Hussein would not cease allocating seats to the
West Bank, thereby recognizing the PLO's authority over the
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West Bank. Instead he dissolved the entire parliament and
ended Jordan's semblance of democracy. In 1983, Hussein
used a new constitution to increase his influence in the West
Bank. The West Bank was allocated seats which were filled
by a vote of a new Parliament chosen by East Bankers. The
new parliament, however, has not held influence over the West
Bank, which has been controlled by local mayors and the PLO.
(Long 231) Clearly, the political history of Jordan and
Palestine are so strong that their political futures will be
interwoven.
The true interest of the Palestinians is to establish a
genuine democracy without suffering through a civil war. The
establishment of an automonous Palestinian state in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip would condemn the Palestinians to a civil
war which could plunge the entire region into war. A Palestinian
democracy is possible, provided the region is not disturbed by
war. After Hussein dies, there will be a crisis of legitimacy,
similar to the one which beset the monarchy after Abdullah's
assassination. In order to maintain the legitimacy of the
monarchy, Hasan, Hussein' s successor, will promulgate a new
constitution to establish more democratic freedoms and rights,
as in 1952 under Abdullah's successor Talal. This time,
however, the king will not be able to subvert or abrogate the
constitution because his people will demand political control.
Since Jordan's economic woes will indubitably continue
throughout this century, Hasan won't be able to buy the loyalty
of his constituents, as Abdullah and Hussein had aptly done.
Thus, within the next 20 years, a Palestinian majority will elect
Palestinian official who will assert control over a nominally
Jordanian state. Jordan will be Palestine.
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